Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2007

Nelda P. Johnson v. Golds Gym, and Peay
Investment Company: Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Scott T. Evans; Heather L. Thuet; Christensen & Jensen; Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees.
S. Austin Johnson; Johnson Law Associates; Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Johnson v. Golds Gym, No. 20070946 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/585

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL^
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

Nelda P. Johnson,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Golds Gym, and Peay Investment Company,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appellate Court Docket No. 20070946-CA

Brief of Appellant Nelda P. Johnson

Appeal of Grant of Summary Judgment by
Trial Court, Fourth Judicial District Court, The Hon. David N. Mortensen,
Lower Court Case Nos. 070102050, American Fork Division;
and 0504001206 PI, Provo Division.
Scott T. Evans, USB #6218
Heather L. Thuet, USB #10106
Christensen & Jensen, P.C.
15 West South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Tel. (801)323.5000
Fax: (801)355-3472
Attorneys tor Defendants-Appeilees

S. Austin Johnson, USB #5179
Johnson Law Associates
345-B East University Parkway
Orem, UT 84058
Tel. (801)426-7900
Fax (801) 805-4815
Attorney tor Nelda P. Johnson,
Pljaintiff-Appeilant
FILED
UTAH APPELLATE CO"JPTQ

JUN 1 2 2008

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

Nelda P. Johnson,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Golds Gym, and Peay Investment Company,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appellate Court Docket No. 20070946-CA

Brief of Appellant Nelda P. Johnson

Appeal of Grant of Summary Judgment by
Trial Court, Fourth Judicial District Court, The Hon. David N. Mortensen,
Lower Court Case Nos. 070102050, American Fork Division;
and 0504001206 PI, Provo Division.
Scott T. Evans, USB #6218
Heather L. Thuet, USB #10106
Christensen & Jensen, P.C.
15 West South Temple, Suite 800
Sait Lake City, UT 84101
Tel. (801)323.5000
Fax: (801)355-3472
.Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees

S. Austin Johnson, USB #5179
Johnson Law Associates
345-B East University Parkway
Orem, UT 84058
Tel. (801)426-7900
Fax (801) 805-4815
Attorney for Nelda P. Johnson.
Plaintiff-Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3
W
b
9)

RELEVANT FACTS

1^

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

21

DETAIL OF ARGUMENT

23

CONCLUSION and RELIEF SOUGHT

H$

ADDENDUM

b\

2

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Utah Statutes
UCA , Section 78-2-2(3)0)

^

UCA, Section 78-13-9

41

UCA, Section 78-13-10

H2

Utah Rules
Rules 63, Ut.Civ.Proc

43

Rule 63A, Ut.Civ.Proc

...43

Rule 33(b), UT.Civ.Proc

..MM

MUJI 11.3

3>M

MUJI 11.12

65

Utah Case Law
Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, Inc.,
538 P.23d 175 (Utah 1975)

33

Anderson v. Mammoth Mining Co.,
26 Utah 357, 73 P. 412(1903).

42

Dowling v. Bullen,
2004UT50, 94P.3d915

Z3

Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewelers,
811 P.2d 182, 183 (UT 1991)
Ghionis v. Deer Vallev Resort Co
839 F.Supp. 789 (UT 1993).

23

14,25,21*

Gillett v. Price,
2006 UT 24,
Glenn v. Gibbons & Reed Co
265 P.2d 1013 (1954).
Goebel v. Salt Lake City S.RR,
2004 UT 80, 104 P.3d 1185
In re Discipline of Sonnenreich,
2004UT3, 86P.3d712,
Matheson v. Marbec Investments, LLC,
173 P.3d 199 (UTApp. 2007)
Mitchell v. Christensen,
2001 UT 80, 31 P.13d572.

45

24

...................S^-i

28

To

6%

Nelson v. Salt Lake City,
919P.2d568, 571 (UT 1996

V>

Pollari v. Salt Lake City,
111 Utah 25, 176 P.2d 111 (1947).

?>1

Russ v. Woodside Homes, Inc.,
905 P.2d 901, 905 (Ut.App.1995).

24

Walker Bank & Trust v. First Security Corp.,

23

341 P.2d 944 (UT 1959).
Caselaw, Other Jurisdictions:
Valley National Bank v. Tang,
18 Ariz.App. 40, 499 P.2d 991 (1972)
American Automobile Insurance Co. v
Seaboard Surety,
155 Cal.App.2d 192, 318 P.2d 84 (1958)

14
24

Anderson & Nafziger v. GT Newcomb, Inc.,
595 P.2d 209 (ID 1979)

24

Harris v. Old Kent Bank,
735 NE.2d 758, 764 (Ill.App.2000)

44

Tallev v. Skellv Oil Co
199 Kan. 767, 433 P.2d 425 (1967)

24

Yang v. Voyagaire Houseboats, Inc.,
701 NW.2d 783, 789 (Minn.2005)

50

Stewart v. Reynolds,
84 SW.3d 569, 573 (Mo.App.2002)

^H

Adloo v. Brown,
344 Md. 254, 686 A.2d 298, 301 (Md.1996)

0^

Johnson v. Rapid City Softball Assn.,
514NW.2d693(SD1994)

$

Atkins v. Swimwest Family Fitness Center,
691 NW.2d 334, 338, 340 (Wisc.2005).

Z4 (21 ffl

Treatises:
Black's Law Dictionary 733 (6th ed. 1991)

?>%

The Websters Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary

£»

R.2d Contracts,
Sec. 195(a)(ALI).
R.2d Torts, Chap. 13,

2$
VD

R.2d Torts, Section 342

%24

R. 2d Torts, Section 343

%,^2fl
5

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-22(3)(j), review of a final judgment

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
L

The Trial Court erred in ruling that Appellant Johnson released
Appellee Gym for injuries in its parking lot when she signed the
membership agreement.
Whether the exculpatory clause in the membership agreement
with Golds Gym waives Appellant Johnson's negligence action for
injuries suffered in the parking lot. The clause should be strictly
construed against the gym because it is ambiguous, the parking lot is
not conspicuously mentioned, and it is against public policy.

II.

Appellant Johnson's claim of injury from an unsafe condition on
property does not arise from a temporary condition on property and
she does not have to prove that Appellees had notice and a
reasonable time to fix the unsafe condition as a precondition to
Appellees' liability.

Whether the injury from the unsafe parking lot arose from an unsafe
condition of a permanent nature. The gym has an ongoing duty to its
business invitee to inspect, maintain and repair the parking lot. It also owes
a duty to the public who uses the same parking lot. The defects are open,
obvious and apparent to the Appellees. The parking lot would be safe if this
ongoing duty were met. The Appelles should be responsible for the parking
lot, which makes this a permanent condition on land.
III.

The trial court erred in finding there is no factual issue on whether
the defendants had constructive notice of the unsafe condition of
the parking lot.

The facts in the record provided in the addendum, clearly show a fact
issue that cannot be resolved on summary judgment of whether the
6

Appellees had constructive notice, or are deemed by operation of law
because of their breaches of their duty concerning the parking lot, to have
knowledge of the unsafe condition of the parking lot so Appellant Johnson
does not have to show this precondition for her action if it is based on the
temporary condition analysis.
IV.

The trial court was the improper venue to
decide the motion for summary judgment.

Appellant Johnson did not get to express her opposition when the case
was transferred from the most convenient and proper forum in Provo, UT, to
American Fork, UT, after it had been pending for 2 years in Provo.
V.

The trial court abused its discretion in striking Appellant Johnson's
experts witnesses.

The new trial court judge abused his discretion by denying Appellant
Johnson's request for time to get the facts for her experts before providing
the experts reports. The delay in getting the facts was caused by Appellees
failure to comply with discovery obligations.
VI.

The trial court was without jurisdiction to enter an order on
the motion to reconsider or on defendant's motion to strike
Plaintiffs photographs and erroneously seeks to impose a rule
barring any pre-final-judgment motions to reconsider.

The trial court wants to promote a rule barring motions to reconsider
pre-final judgment rulings. Appellant Johnson filed a motion to reconsider
the memorandum decision that granted summary judgment. The trial court
granted a final judgment 10 days later. Then, Appellant Johnson appealed
within 30 days. Her appeal removed jurisdiction from the trial court to
decide the motion to reconsider. But then the trial court still entered a new
memorandum opinion 12 days after the notice of appeal was filed.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of Case.
This case is an action in negligence where Plaintiff-Appellant Nelda

P. Johnson (herein "Appellant Johnson") seeks damages for personal injuries
suffered in a trip and fall on July 9, 2004, at 9:30 p.m., at defendant's
parking lot.
Appellant Johnson was injured in a trip and fall accident on unsafe
asphalt in the parking lot at Gold's Gym in Provo, Utah. She incurred about
$30,000 in medical expenses for a surgery required to connect the ligaments
to her knee cap.
Appellant Plaintiff signed a membership agreement with Gold's Gym
on July 7, 2004. Gold's Gym is located on 900 East in Provo, UT. She
went to the gym for her first time on July 9, 2004, with her daughter, son-inlaw, and son. She finished her workout and was leaving at about 9:30 p.m.
When the family was leaving the gym Appellant Johnson tripped and fell on
broken asphalt. Her knee swelled immediately and she was taken to the
Orem Community Hospital. She had surgery to repair the knee after
physical therapy was unable help her. She seeks compensation for her
injuries caused by negligence.

8

Defendant-Appellee Gold's Gym (herein "Appellee Gym") leases the
property where its gym is located from Defendant-Appellee Peay Investment
Con ipany (1 lei eii 1"" ' , Lppellee Pea,)/ ' "")

(

'\ ppellee Gym operates its business of

a fitness centei h] ' charging foi adi i lissioi i ai i- :i i i lei i lbei si lip

Course of Proceedings
The civil action ii i negligence was filed in Provo, UT, on April 13,
2005. The parties went through discovery, which was supposed to end on
,

..\ \

* witnesses finally made available by

But Appellee Peay did not file iu> OPL .

- atoi ies

and requests for production of documents until March 5, 2007. These
answers were not timely. They were provided after coin isel called and
IniIIiided counsel they had failed to file them. Then,, the answers, instead of
pro\ uliiii! inluriimfiuii fii\i .usscifnl oh|c.rlioir, lo every request. In addition,
Appellee Peay failed to ever mrT

n

during the period of fact discovery. It finally made its owner available for a
deposition or- \Trr

1

1 „ 200" I

The aciioii nad proceedec
15, 2007
interest and sent the n<

i _•

.-, cr answered the discovery requests.
^ovo. UT from April 13, 2005, to May
.,**.;; e had a possible conflict of
" on

9

May 15, 2007. The parties were not consulted, asked to consent, or given
any chance to comment on the transfer.
Appellant Johnson filed a motion to compel answers to the discovery
responses on May 16, 2007, now in the new court in American Fork.
Appellees responded on May 21, 2007, and merely complained that
appellant's counsel had not conferred with them before he filed the motion.
In the middle of the conflict over discovery, Defendants-Appellees
filed a motion for summary judgment on April 4, 2007. Appellant Johnson
filed a Motion for Extension of time to respond to the motion for summary
judgment on April 24, 2007. She explained that two of her witnesses were
out of state and needed additional time to provide an affidavit, that she had
only received the motion two days prior to the deadline to respond, and that
she needed time to get expert reports. She indicated she had been delayed in
getting expert reports because of the failure of Appellee Peay to cooperate in
discovery.
Defendants-Appellees filed a motion to strike plaintiffs experts on or
about April 27, 2007. Appellant Johnson responded to this motion to strike
her experts on May 16, 2007. The new trial judge in American Fork, UT,
who just got the case on May 15, 2007, filed an order striking Appellant's
experts related to the defective asphalt on July 2, 2007, and he gave

10

Appellant Johnson seven days to respond to the motion for summary
judgment.
A (»| >el Ices sought summary judgment claiming that Appellant Johnson
was

- (I

: ember ship contract 1 lad

a clause that prevented her from siiin^i (or aii \ ii'iuii.* ll..il *

e< .'

'lie

premises. Appellees also claimed the injuries arose from defective asphalt
in the parking lot, which is a temporary condition so Appellant Johnson must
show the Appellees had notice of the defective asphalt before the fall and
pu-

«. .; p.!,a:ii Johnson

n *p .«i.u iall. Appellees

argued A nrv '

. , issues so

summary judgment should be granted.
r

Disposition of Trial Court

The American Fork trial judge granted summary judgment in a
memorandum decision on September 1 7, 200 7 I he trial court ruled that the
Appellees are not LilT IH/I a u v /\p|M,JLei( Juliiisuii signed a release
provision in her membership contract

*

:

-*

liability for injuries suffered in the parking lot. It also ruled that Appellees
are not negligent as a matter of law because the parking lot defect was
•'ornry in nature and Plaintiff failed to show actual or constructive notice
'•• •^'V'lii;.-;

c parking lot pn<;; io :iie trip .uui 'all accident;

i

and failed to show that Appellees had sufficient time to cure the temporary
premises defect and failed to do so.
Appellant Johnson filed a motion to reconsider the memorandum
decision granting summary judgment on October 10, 2007. The trial court
filed its order and judgment granting summary judgment on October 18,
2007. The trial court did not rule on the motion to reconsider before the
appeal deadline was reached so Appellant Johnson filed her notice of appeal
on November 17, 2007.
The trial court, on November 29, 2007, 12 days after the notice of
appeal was filed, denied Appellant Johnson's motion to reconsider the ruling
on summary judgment, denied her motion compel discovery against
Appellee Peay because it ruled it was moot, and granted Appellees motion to
strike photographs that were submitted with the motion to reconsider.
The motion to reconsider also raised the issue that venue was
improper in American Fork. The trial court said this issue was waived
because it was not raised earlier.
The trial court also refused to let Appellant Johnson use any expert
witnesses to address the defect in the parking lot asphalt.

12

RELEVANT FACTS
The trial court, stated two facts are not in dispute, which are in dispute.
1

. ;

acts are:

Fact No. /, Prior to being informed by plaintiff of her
injury and the defect in the parking lot that caused it, defendants
had never observed or been made aware of any dangerous
condition, either cracks or holes, existing within the asphalt
parking lot.
^ ic- N< * " Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that
defendants hau noiice of any dangerous condition existing in
the parking lot prior io plaintiffs fall.
Motrin I Ve i t

In addition, then, i .1 I i« I J <li 1 id

m Jul I HI I lie exculpatory

clause in the membership contract with / r
These two alleged uncontroverted facts from the Uiai cuuii
• \vnw because of constructive notice and whether the unsafe
property should be evaluated as a permanent
condit

i

.

.

• c ixnn^e in

the membership contract is relevam in whether thr rnnii:in JK 101 in
strictly construed against Appellee Gym.
The relevant facts in the record show these factual issues. The
fo] -

ig references are to the attachments to the Plaintiffs memorandum in
in,,, !IT \lc\ niiMcteialioti ofOrdei Granting Summary
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Judgment, filed Oct. 10, 2007, and included in the addendum. These fact
disputes include the following:
1.

Plaintiff, in her response to the motion for summary
judgment, page 6, specifically denied the alleged facts
stated by defendant. She said, "[a]lleged fact nos. 11-12
are false." Then she explained that Appellees alleged
that they never observed or were made aware of the
unsafe condition of the parking lot. Appellant Johnson
disputed this clain and stated Appellees neglected to take
care of the parking lot.

2.

Troy Petersen has been the Chief Financial Officer for
Gold's Gym for 11 years, an Owner of 10% of the stock
in 15 gyms, and in charge of maintenance. T. Petersen
Depo., dated 2/1/07, At 3,4,6,7, attached as Exhibit 2.

3.

He accepts that Appellee Gym has the responsibility of
maintaining and keeping in good repair the parking lot.
Id. At 19.

4.

Mr. Petersen has never seen a crack that may pose a
danger to patrons. T. Petersen Depo., At 15.

14

Mr. Petersen was given Plaintiffs letter on October 12,
2004, describing her injury and complaining of the
bi okei 1 asp! lalt I I 'etersen depo. At 8; Ex. 1. I le never .
responded In Ihr kiln n r \ n in\ estimated In >,u \ line .'
she was injured, nor had anyone else investigate

I :i - t

0, ]<nM !

The or\W repairs were done in 1997, and then September
^eterson Depo.

Oi day

cUllUilK

;-H, 16. Mr. Petersen

'• ,1

f

12-14. They only had paid $1,000 for the entire parking
lot repair, Ex. 2.
Plaintiff investigated this claim of repair to the parking
person who reportedly
repaired the pawn in 11 mil1 in I illni \ iinnir ii'ieatei .H iin
house of Mr. Petersen and did not repair the pavement
Memo. Reconsider, Exhibit 1, para. 9-10.
N li Petersen hired a maintenance director. Nate Loftin
Depn,. daled Febr. 1, lull " I o, /. attached as Exhibit 3.
1'hi' inaintenaiKo dir^'Mor direr!s 10 v:v oi ker s I oftii i

Depo. At 13. He has never requested any of the ten
employees to maintain the parking lot._kl. at 15. His
specific duties include maintaining the equipment and
building, which takes 95% of his time. Id. at 14-15, 7.
His duties do not include maintaining the parking lot. Id.
He has never been given any instructions about how to
maintain the parking lot. Id. At 7. He never has
inspected the parking lot where Plaintiff was injured. Id.
There is nobody else is in charge of the parking lot
maintenance. Id. 7-8. He has been in charge of
maintenance for Gold's Gym since July 1999. Id. At 6,
But he never knew of Plaintiff s incident in the parking
lot until January 2007. Id. At 16-17.
Even the President of the company did not know it had a
duty to maintain the parking lot. L. Felsted Depo., dated
2/1/2007, at 9-12, attached as Exhibit 4. She has never
controlled maintenance of the property nor has she ever
directed a maintenance program, Id. But she recognizes
that if an injury were reported, she would want it
investigated and reported to her immediately. Id At 18.

10-

Appellee Peay has owned the property since 1958. It
leased it in 1995 to Gold's Gym. A large portion of the
parking lot was repaved in 2003-2004. Deposition of
Lynn Tregeagle, dated May 11, 2007 (herein "T. Depo")
at 9, 48-52, attached as Exhibit 6. The Property Owner is
an architect, has built ten houses, and owned a floor
covering store for 25 years. T. Depo. At 8,9,11. The
Property Owner denies any responsibility to make the
property safe for business invitees. T. Depo. At 37. It
has no policy for inspecting the property. T. Depo. At
38. It is not aware of any maintenance done to the
property since 1995. T. Depo. At 33, 27. The property
owner left all responsibility to care for the parking lot to
Appellee Gym. T. Depo. At 16.

11.

Exhibit 1 Attached to Appellant Johnson's declaration,
has three maps attached to it as pages 7-9. The maps
show a portion of the parking lot that was paved by 2004.
Mr. Tregeagle testified this work was done in 2003 or
2004. T. Depo., 49-52. The earliest map from 2000
shows that a building was sitting on the parking lot in

17

2000. No person has yet provided the name of who did
this pavement. Their stonewalling has totally prevented
discovery on the condition of the pavement.
12.

The photographs attached as Exhibit 1 show the unsafe,
defective condition of the parking lot. The first pictures,
pages 1-2, show the site about the time of Plaintiff s
accident. Then, the pictures on pages 3-4 show the same
cracks were still there in March 2005, eight months after
the accident. Finally, recent pictures from 2007, pages 56, show the repair to the small section of the asphalt by
2007, but show that there are still serious potholes.

13.

Pictures on pages 7, 8 and 9, show aerial overflights of
the property in 2000, 2004 and 2006. Mr. Treageagle
testified of how a building was taken from the property in
2003 or 4, and pavement covered the whole where the
building was taken. T. Depo. at 49-52.

14.

Mr. Peterson believes that cracks do not pose dangers to
patrons but only repairs them for aesthetic fixes. T.
Petersen dep. At 16. He has never seen a crack in a
parking lot that he thinks poses a danger to a patron. Id.

18

at 15. Mr. Petersen never commented on the condition of
the parking lot to anyone. He has never made any report
about the condition of the parking lot. He only walked
occasionally through the parking lot to look at its
condition. Id. at 16.
15.

A trip hazard exists if pavement has Vi to 3A inch ledge.
T. Depo., At 55-56.

16.

The maintenance director has repaired one pothole at
another location in West Jordan. He did it because it was
reported by a patron. It was only 3A inches deep, and 18
inches in diameter. But he believed it needed to be
repaired so it would not injure somebody. They
barricaded the pothole until it was repaired. Loftin Depo.,
pages 9-11.

17.

The maintenance director has never been trained to
maintain the parking lots. Loftin Depo. At 12-13., 18.

18.

The manger Kandi Negrete, has never been trained in
doing property maintenance. K. Negrete Depo. date
Febr. 1, 2007, At 29, attached as Exhibit 5. She has not

19

done or managed any property maintenance. Negrete
Depo. At 8.
19.

The RELEASE/EXCULPATORY CLAUSE is
ambiguous on whether it releases liability for negligence
in maintaining the parking lot. Mr. Petersen is familiar
with the contract. He has no opinion whether the
assumption of the risk clause relate to injuries in the
parking lot. T. Petersen Depo. At 22.

20.

The sales manager admitted that she do not explain the
contract. Negrete Depo. AT 10.

20

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
First, the trial court was incorrect in finding that Appellant Johnson's
action in negligence was barred by the release in the membership contract.
The exculpatory clause in the membership contract should be strictly
construed against Appellee Gym because it wrote it, it is ambiguous, the
release of liability for injuries in the parking lot is not conspicuously stated,
and it is against public policy.
Second, the trial court erred as a matter of law and fact in finding that
the broken pavement in the parking lot was an unsafe condition of a
temporary nature that required proof of notice to the defendants and time to
cure the defect. Appellees have a permanent duty owed to their business
invitees to inspect and maintain the parking lot. They failed to meet this
obligation. The condition was obvious and apparent. The unsafe condition
would not exist on the property if Appelles met their permanent duty.
Therefore, the unsafe condition must be analyzed as one of a permanent
nature.
Third, the trial court erred in finding there is no fact issue of
constructive notice concerning the defective condition of the parking lot.
This case was decided on summary judgment. The facts and inferences must
be viewed in the light favorable to Appellant Johnson.

The facts infer that

21

Appellees did not inspect the parking lot, had no maintenance program for it,
and did not provide truthful information about the repairs done to the
parking lot.

These facts require that Appellees be deemed to have

constructive knowledge of the unsafe conditions on the property that caused
injuries to Appellant Johnson.
Fourth, the trial court that decided the motion for summary judgment
was the improper venue for this cause of action. The case had been pending
for two years in Provo. Then, six weeks after summary judgment was filed,
the Provo court sent the action to a new judge in American Fork. This
transfer of the case was in violation of state law. Appellant Johnson was not
advised, consulted, given a chance to consent or object to this change. The
matter should be sent back to Provo.
Fifth, the trial court abused its discretion in striking Appellant
Johnson's expert witnesses. The delay in getting reports from the experts
was caused in large part by the failure to provide fact discovery by Appellee
Peay. Plaintiff should have been allowed time to get the fact discovery, then
to provide the expert's reports before summary judgment was entered.
Sixth and finally, the trial court ruling of November 29, 2007, should
be stricken. It was filed 12 days after the notice of appeal was entered in this
matter. It lacked jurisdiction to enter the order.

22

DETAIL OF ARGUMENT
This negligence action was dismissed on summary judgment. When
this Court reviews an order granting summary judgment, which presents a
question of law, its employs a correctness standard and views the facts and
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Matheson v. Marbec Investments, LLC, 173 P.3d 199
(UT App. 2007); Dowling v. Bullen, 2004 UT 50, 94 P.3d 915.
Furthermore, summary judgment should rarely be granted in negligence
actions because they require drawing inferences from the facts, which is
properly done by juries rather than judges. Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919
P.2d 568, 571 (UT 1996) (quoting Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewelers, 811 P.2d
182, 183 (UT 1991)).
I.
The Trial Court erred in ruling that Appellant Johnson released
Appellee Gym for injuries in its parking lot when she signed the
membership agreement.
The trial court ignored precedent and advanced its own agenda of
eliminating the strict construction rule against exculpatory clauses and held
it barred Appellant Johnson's negligence action against Appellee Gym for
injuries she suffered in its parking lot. Utah courts strictly construe contract
clauses that attempt to limit one's liability unless the preclusion against
negligence is clearly and unequivocally stated. Walker Bank & Trust v.

23

First Security Corp., 341 P.2d 944 (UT 1959).
The courts look with disfavor on attempts to avoid liability and
construe exculpatory clauses strictly against the entity relying on them,
especially when it prepared the document. American Automobile Insurance
Co. v. Seaboard Surety, 155 Cal.App.2d 192, 318 P.2d 84 (1958); Talley v.
Skelly Oil Co., 199 Kan. 767, 433 P.2d 425 (1967); Walker Bank & Trust
Co. v. First Security Corp., 341 P.2wd 944 (1959). Clauses which exclude
liability must speak clearly and directly to the particular conduct of the
defendant which caused the harm at issue. Anderson & Nafziger v. GT
Newcomb, Inc., 595 P.2d 209 (ID 1979); Valley National Bank v. Tang, 18
Ariz.App. 40, 499 P.2d 991 (1972).
The trial court must look at the purpose of the entire agreement, its
context, and its subject, together with the facts and surrounding
circumstances to see if there is a clear and unequivocal expression of the
parties intent. Russ v. Woodside Homes, Inc., 905 P.2d 901, 905
(Ut.App.1995). Exculpatory agreements are not binding if they do not
clearly and unequivocally express the parties' agreement to absolve a
defendant of liability. Ghionis v. Deer Valley Resort Co., 839 F.Supp. 789
(UT 1993). An overbroad exculpatory clause in a waiver form is
unenforceable. Atkins v. Swimwest Family Fitness Center, 691 NW.2d 334,

24

338, 340 (Wisc.2005).

But the trial court erroneously sought to "limit the

application of this strict construction rule" and refused to apply it against
Appellee Gym. Memo. Dec. at 4 of 11.
Appellee Gym wrote the exculpatory clause in its contract. The
language should be strictly construed against it. The signature was obtained
by a salesman who wanted Appellant Johnson to join the gym, and who
distracted her from reading, analyzing and understanding the release clause
in the contract. The saleman did not explain the clause. Relev. Fact No. 20.
Even the owner of the gym does not know if it releases liability for injuries
in the parking lot. Relev. Fact No. 19. Also, the exculpatory clause is
ambiguous, overbroad and against public policy. It should be narrowly
construed.
The court must look at the purpose of the clause so as to strictly
construe it. For example, in Ghionis, supra, Deer Valley argued its "as is"
clause in a contract precluded a claim for breach of implied warranty. But
the court reviewed the document from a layman's perspective and found the
purpose of the agreement was to get the user to care for the equipment while
in his possession. It also found the "as is" was not conspicuous, in bold, or
in italics, but just in plain text. Therefore, it refused to enforce the
exculpatory clause.
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In the instant case, the purpose of the contract was to allow Appellant
Johnson to become a member of the gym. The release was to get patrons
who use the gym equipment to inspect the machines before they use them. It
was to tell the patron that he, as well as the trainer, should look at the
equipment to see if it works before using it. The user, the member, has the
last chance to adjust, observe and decide to use each piece of equipment.
The gym maintains the equipment to keep its members happy. One would
not interpret this release as including any injury suffered in the parking lot
because of the gym's negligence.
In Ghionis, the court also looked at the conspicuous language to
decide whether to apply the release. Here, the conspicuous language, in
capital letters in the release read, "ANY PERSON USING THE
EQUIPMENT OR THE FACILITIES DOES SO AT THEIR OWN RISK."
This language in no way related to the parking lot. But then Appellee Gym
expanded the language in the release beyond the language in the
conspicuous, capital letters. The plain text following the conspicuous words
adds that the release also applies to "the premises where the same is
located." Appellant Johnson maintains the meaning of "premises" is
ambiguous. But if one assumes, as the trial court did, that "premises"
means the parking lot, then this language relating to the premises is inserted
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in a way the member will not appreciate that the release is going to apply to
the premises, as well as to the equipment or facilities. This release for
liability parking lot should not be allowed because the word "premises" was
not included in the conspicuous language.
An example of when an overbroad release in a fitness club's
membership agreement was not enforced is in Atkins v. Swimwest Family
Fitness Center, 691 NW.2d 334, 338, 340 (Wisc.2005). There, a mom
drowned in a swimming pool. The Court of Appeals refused to enforce the
exculpatory clause. The clause said, "I assume all liability for myself
without regard to fault. I hold harmless the Fitness Center for any condition
or injury to myself." Id. at 340. The court looked at the facts and
circumstances surrounding the agreement to see if it was broad enough to
cover the activity at issue. If not, it was unenforceable. It explained that
public policy restricts freedom of contract for the good of the community.
Id. at 339.

The contract may be void if it does not alert the signer to what

is being waived, and to the significance of what is waived. Id. The Gold's
Gym release did not alert Appellant Johnson to the alleged fact that by
signing the membership agreement she was releasing Appellee Gym from
negligently failing to maintain the parking lot. The clause is overbroad and
not enforceable.
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An exculpatory clause is overbroad if it covers too many acts. For
example, does the release purport to release intentional acts, reckless acts,
and negligent acts? Any release of intentional and reckless acts are clearly a
violation of public policy. R.2d Torts, Section 195(a)(ALI). When a release
is overbroad, against public policy, it must be strictly construed against the
party who wrote it. Swimwest, supra, 691 NW.2d at 341. Here, the release
is overbroad because it is not limited to claims of negligence but it applies
against claims of intentional and reckless torts.
The trial court reasoned that even though the release did not
"explicitly mention negligence on the part of Gold's Gym, the language is
clearly broad enough to include those instances in which Gold's Gym may
be negligent." Memo.Dec. at 5. But it also is so broad as to include
intentional or reckless actions. It should not be enforced because it is too
broad.
In addition, public policy prohibits an exculpatory clause that tries to
exempt one from a duty he owes to the public. R.2d Contracts, Sec. 195
(ALI, 1979), reads:
2.
A term exempting a party from tort liability for
harm negligently caused is unenforceable on grounds of
public policy if
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b) the term exempts one charged with a duty of public
service from liability to one to whom the duty is owed for
compensation for breach of that duty.
Appellee Gym has a duty to make its parking lot safe. It owes this duty to
the public that uses the other stores in the strip mall. It operates its own
business by charging for public admission when members want to use its
gym. Public policy dictates that Appellee Gym cannot exempt itself from
liability in negligence against its patrons by requiring them to sign an
exculpatory clause in their membership contract when it cannot exempt itself
from this liability against the public.
The trial court relies on Woodside Homes to justify its ruling to
enforce the release in the membership agreement. Memo Dec. at 4-5. But it
is clearly distinguishable from this action. There, the parties were
sophisticated contractors, builders and developers. The exculpatory clause
limited the liability for a temporary time period, during the construction, and
it only limited claims arising from visiting the jobsite. The jobsite is
admittedly a dangerous place during construction. The contract made the
parties aware of the inherent risk in the construction site. It was like a
warning, "hard hat area." The clause required insurance from the contractor
to cover the temporary risk of danger. The contractor got paid for providing
services and to buy insurance to cover his risks during the construction.
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Therefore, the court allowed the shifting of responsibility. But Appellant
Johnson is not sophisticated like builders. Her use of the parking lot should
not entail a risk of engaging in a dangerous activity. She should not be on
high alert just because she parked in Gold Gym's parking lot. The clause
and contract did not alert her to the risk associated with the parking lot.
The release clause should not be enforced when it releases a defendant
from his own negligence. See Adloo v. Brown, 344 Md. 254, 686 A.2d 298,
301 (Md.l996)(a realtor made its listed property owners sign a release but
this did not release the realtor from its own negligence when it mistakenly
gave the lock box combination to a thief who stole $40,000 in jewelry from
a listed house.) Likewise, a duty to the general public cannot be released by
an exculpatory clause because it violates public policy. Johnson v. Rapid
City Softball Assn., 514 NW.2d 693 (SD 1994)(city exculpatory clause
releasing it from all negligence in maintaining its public athletic fields was
unenforceable on public policy grounds.) An innkeeper could not
circumvent its duty to protect guests by an exculpatory clause because it had
a duty to the public. Yang v. Voyagaire Houseboats, Inc., 701 NW.2d 783,
789 (Minn.2005) (houseboat renter released company when leased boat, but
exculpatory clause unenforceable where renter suffered carbon monoxide
poisoning on vacation.
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Clearly, the release is overbroad and against public policy. It is
designed to release liability for the use of exercise equipment, which may be
dangerous and the user should use caution before using it. But it cannot be
applied to negligence claims arising out of the use of the parking lot.
Lastly, with regard to the exculpatory clause in the contract, the trial
court erred in finding that the word "premises" in the contract clearly and
unequivocally refers to the parking lot. Memo. Dec. at 6. Premises does not
clearly and unambiguously include a parking lot. The Websters
Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary says one meaning, particularly in legal
contracts, for instance in fire insurance, refers to buildings on land. Also,
premises, in a rental agreement, describes the apartment being rented. Even
the President of the gym does not know if the release applies to claims
arising in negligence in the parking lot. Fact F, supra. The word "premises"
is ambiguous because it has several possible meanings. The release clause is
overbroad because it does not clearly and unequivocally apply to the parking
lot. It should not be enforce against Appellant Johnson to preclude her
action for her injuries suffered in the parking lot.

II.

Appellant Johnson's claim of injury from an unsafe condition on
property does not arise from a temporary condition on property
and she does not have to prove that Appellees had notice and a
reasonable time to fix the unsafe condition as a precondition to
Appellees5 liability.
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The trial court indicated that in premises liability cases, Utah case law
creates two classes of unsafe conditions: those that are temporary, and those
that are of a permanent nature. Memo. Dec. at 7 of 11. The Court held as a
matter of law that unsafe asphalt in a parking lot is a temporary condition.
Memo. Dec. at 7-8 of 11. Then it found that defendants had never observed
or been made aware of any dangerous condition , either cracks or holes,
existing within the asphalt parking lot." Memo Dec. at 2, para. 7. And
"Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that defendants had notice of any
dangerous condition existing in the parking lot prior to plaintiffs fall."
Memo. Dec. at 3, para. 11. The unsafe asphalt clearly occurred over time
and is a result of lack of maintenance. But these facts do not mean that the
unsafe condition is temporary in nature. The unsafe condition may have
been there for years because of a long pattern of failure to maintain.
When an unsafe condition on property is temporary, then fault cannot
be imputed to the defendant so that liability results unless two conditions
result: (a) that the defendant had knowledge or constructive notice of the
condition; and (b) defendant had sufficient time to fix the unsafe condition
after he knew about it, but did not fixit. Goebel v. Salt Lake City S.RR,
2004 UT 80, 104P.3d 1185.
When the unsafe condition is of a permanent nature a plaintiff does
32

not have to show that the defendant had notice of the unsafe condition. This
later class is described as follows:
[It] involes some unsafe condition of a permanent nature,
such as: in the structure of the building, or of a stairway, etc. or
in equipment or machinery or in the manner of use, which was
created or chosen by the defendant (or his agents) or for which
he is responsible. In such circumstances, where defendant
either created the condition, or is responsible for it, he is
deemed to know of the condition; and no further proof of notice
is necessary.

Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., 538 P.23d 175 (Utah 1975), QUOTED
in Goebel, 104 P.2d at 1193. This case is one where Appellees are
responsible for the condition and notice is not required for Appellant
Johnson to go forward in her negligence action. Appellees are responsible
for the condition because of their duty as possessors of land to business
invitees, and Appellee Gym is has the duty to maintain the parking lot under
the lease contract between Appellees.
The R.2d Torts, Chap. 13, provides for liability for the condition and
use of land. There is a difference in the duties imposed by Section 342 as
compared with Section 343, Restatement 2d. The former only imposes a
duty on the possessor of land when he knows of a dangerous condition and
fails to cure it. The Court's analysis may apply to a cause of action under

Section 342, where notice and a chance to cure are critical elements of the
cause of action.
The later section, Section 343, R.2d Torts, applies in this case. The
possessor has a greater duty, an affirmative duty, to make the property
reasonably safe for the use of its business invitees. The business holds the
land open to the business invitee, it gives the implied assurance that the land
is prepared, made ready and safe for the reception of the business invitee and
his use. The relevant facts , nos. 2-18. supra, show a genuine fact issue of
whether Appellees failed to make the parking lot safe for its business
invitees.
MUJI 11.3, states, "One who extends to a business visitor an
invitation, ..., is obliged to refrain from acts of negligence and to exercise
ordinary care to keep the premises in a condition reasonable safe for
business visitors." See Glenn v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 265 P.2d 1013
(1954). This jury instruction clearly follows Section 343, R.2d Torts. See
also Stewart v. Reynolds, 84 SW.3d 569, 573 (Mo.App.2002)( affirmative
duty to maintain improved parking lot); Harris v. Old Kent Bank, 735 NE.2d
758, 764 (Ill.App.2000)(fact issue whether sidewalk defect is de minimis or
unsafe).
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Likewise, the lessor of the property, Appellee Peay, has a duty to
exercise reasonable care to see that the leased property is safe for the use so
intended, and that the condition of the parking lot will not expose the public
to unreasonable risk of harm. MUJI 11.12. The Court did not address any
basis for dismissing Appellee Peay from this cause of action. The
deposition excerpts from Mr. Tregeagle, on behalf of this Appellee, clearly
indicate that it did nothing to meet its affirmative duty to make sure the
parking lot was safe.
The trial court relies on Goebel in its ruling. But Goebel is clearly
inapplicable in this situation. First, the plaintiff there was not a business
invitee but just a member of the public. Second, The unsafe condition was
not obvious and apparent. It was not discovered even after reasonable
inspections and use. It was two field mats that abutted the railroad tracks.
The plaintiffs expert and plaintiff had been there recently and not
discovered that the mats were separated from the track. Also, the defendant
showed he performed regular inspections. Id. at 194. Appellant Johnson is
owed a higher duty than a member of the public because she is a business
invitee. Appellees owe a duty to its business invitee to perform regular
inspections of the parking lot to keep it safe. The inferences in favor of
Appellant Johnson are that the defects in the parking lot were apparent and
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obvious. There is a genuine issue of fact of whether the property is subject
to the analysis of an unsafe condition of a permanent nature. Therefore,
Goebel does not apply.
The rationale in Goebel for finding the unsafe condition temporary in
nature was that
"a party has notice of conditions that the party itself creates, but
it is not reasonable to presume notice of conditions that
someone else creates (as in Schnuphase), that arise from
malfunction (as in Fishbaugh), or that gradually evolve on their
own.
Id. at 1194.
In Goebel, the rationale is right because the defendant was meeting its
duty. Southern RR was doing regular inspections.

The rationale is that a

party may not know about the unsafe condition long enough to require them
to fix it before some is hurt. But this rationale does not apply to Appellee
Gym. It had a permanent duty to its business invitees to inspect, maintain
and repair its parking lot. But the inference, when viewed in favor of
Appellant Johnson, is that Appellee does not do regular inspection of the
parking lot, it did not assign or train anyone to inspect, maintain or repair the
parking lot. See Relevant Facts Nos. 2-18. Appellee Gym never repaired
the parking lot for nine months after it knew about Appellant Johnson's
injury. Relev. Fact Nos. 5,8. It was not meeting its duty as a business to
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provide a safe place to its business invitees. The unsafe condition of the
parking lot would not gradually evolve over time if Appellee Gym were
performing required inspection and maintenance to keep the parking lot safe
for its business invitees.
Appellees have a duty to maintain their parking lot in good repair.
They are responsible for the condition of the parking lot. This duty is owed
to their business invitees. Their duty is permanent, not temporary. The
unsafe condition should be evaluated under the same standard as an unsafe
condition of a permanent nature.

III.

The trial court erred in finding there is no factual issue on
whether the defendants had constructive notice of the unsafe
condition of the parking lot.

The trial court ruled that there is no evidence the Appellees had constructive
notice of the unsafe condition of the parking lot. Memo.Dec. at 9-10 or 11.
This issue of constructive notice is a fact question and must go to a jury and
not be decided on summary judgment by the trial court. Pollari v. Salt Lake
City, 111 Utah 25, 176 P.2d 111 (1947).
Constructive notice of an unsafe condition is where "information or
knowledge of a fact is imputed to a person by law 'because he could have
discovered the fact by proper diligence, and his situation was such as to cast
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upon him the duty of inquiring into it." In re Discipline of Sonnenreich,
2004 UT 3, 86 P.3d 712, quoting Black's Law Dictionary 733 (6th ed. 1991);
Matheson v. Marbec Investments, LLC, 173 P.3d 199 (Utah.App.2007).
The defendant is imputed with this knowledge when "the defect would be
apparent to ordinary prudent person with like experience, not to persons with
specialized knowledge in the field of construction or real estate. Mitchell v.
Christensen, 2001 UT 80, 31 P.13d 572.
There is a significant fact issue of whether Appellee Gym had
constructive notice of the defect. It never repaired the defective asphalt for
over nine months after it clearly knew about it. Even four years later, it has
only patched parts of the pavement, leaving clearly dangerous, defective
asphalt unrepaired. See Declaration of Nelda Johnson, paras. 6-8. In
addition, it is not telling the truth about the repairs so as to not disclose the
identity of who did the repairs. Declaration of Nelda Johnson, para. 9-10.
The maintenance engineer had no training about what to look for or what
standard should be followed to repair asphalt. No one specifically evaluated
the asphalt. Gold's Gym has not even provided the name of the entity who
patched the asphalt in 2003-04, after the McDonald's building was removed
and an entire section of parking lot was installed. This information is critical
to see what the condition of the parking lot was in at that time.
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The fact issue exists, contrary to the trial court's ruling, of whether
the conduct of Appellee Gym means it failed to perform proper inspections,
failed to inquire into the condition of the parking lot, so it is deemed to have
notice of knowledge of the unsafe condition of the parking lot. This factual
conclusion is a reasonable inference that a jury may make from the facts
presented by Appellant Johnson and it should preclude summary judgment.
This duty to inspect the property is mandated by R. 2d Torts, Section
343, which reads:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm
caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if
he
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would
discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an
unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the
danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them
against the danger.
Constructive notice is the legal consequence imposed on a business when
it has failed to exercise reasonable care to discover the unsafe condition on
its property.
Gold's Gym never had any policy for inspection of the parking lot. It
failed to repair the defective asphalt for over nine months after it clearly
knew about it. Even four years later, it had only patched parts of the
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pavement, leaving clearly dangerous, defective asphalt unrepaired. See
Addendum, Declaration of Nelda Johnson, paras. 6-8.
In addition, Gold's Gym is lying about the repairs so as to not disclose
the identity of who did the repairs. See Addendum, Declaration of Nelda
Johnson, para. 9-10
Furthermore, the deposition testimony supports the inference that Gold's
Gym knew or should have known about the dangerous condition in the
asphalt and failed to cure it over a long period of time. Relev. Fact Nos. 214.
The maintenance engineer had no training on what to look for or what
standard should be followed to repair asphalt. No one specifically evaluated
the asphalt. Id., no. 8. the President of Appellee Gym did not know it had a
duty to maintain the parking lot. Relev. Fact No. 9.
These facts clearly support the fact issue of whether Gold's Gym failed to
conduct reasonable inspections of the parking lot, that the defect was left in
the parking lot when the defendant knew or should of known of its
existence, and that the defendant failed to timely cure the defect. The fact
issue exists contrary to the trial court's ruling.

IV. The trial court was the improper venue to
decide the motion for summary judgment.
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This matter was in front of the judge that entered summary judgment in
this matter for only four months. Defendant filed for summary judgment on
April 6, 2007. Then the court transferred this action from Provo to
American Fork on May 16, 2007, and a new judge was assigned. The new
trial judge issued a memorandum decision granting summary judgment on
September 17,2007.
This legal issue is subject to de novo review, without reference to the trial
court decision. Plaintiff has a right to file her cause of action in the most
convenient forum. She had to choose where venue was proper. She lives
one mile from the Orem courthouse, and just 4 miles from the Provo
courthouse. The American Fork Courthouse is probably 20 miles away.
Plaintiff had to file her lawsuit in Provo and she wanted it there because it is
the most convenient forum for her and her witnesses, and the defendant's
premises where she was injured is there. Gold's Gym is probably just one
mile from the Provo courthouse.
This matter was transferred to American Fork on, or about May 15, 2007,
two years after it had proceeded in Provo, without any notice, request for
consent, or motion. This matter should be remanded for proceedings In
Provo. Once a complaint is filed, the law prescribes when it may be moved
elsewhere. Section 78-13-9 states:
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The court may, on motion, change the place of trial in the
following cases:
(2) when there is reason to believe that an impartial trial cannot
be had in the county, city or precinct designated in the
complaint;
(3) when the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice
would be promoted by the change.
(4) when all the parties to an action, by stipulation or by
consent in open court entered in the minutes, agree that the
place of trial may be changed to another county. Thereupon,
the court must order the change as agreed upon.
A motion for change of venue is timely if made before trial. Anderson v.
Mammoth Mining Co., 26 Utah 357, 73 P. f412 (1903).

Then, Section 78-13-10 states:
If any action or proceeding is commenced or is pending in a
court and the court orders the place of trial to be changed, it
must be transferred for trial to a court the parties may agree
upon by stipulation in writing or made in open court and
entered in the minutes, or if they do not so agree, then to the
nearest court where like objection or cause of making the order
does not exist.
These provisions of the law were violated by transferring this action to
American Fork. This matter was moved without any allegation of an
impartial trial in Provo, without considering the convenience of the
witnesses or parties, and without any stipulation of consent of the parties
change the place where the trial will take place. The law specifically
requires that when an action is pending, the parties have an opportunity to

give input before the place of trial is changed. In this case, the case was
moved when the parties were in the middle of disputes over discovery,
summary judgment and motions to compel. The exigent nature of the
proceedings precluded Plaintiff from considering what rights she may have
had with regard to where the trial would take place.
Likewise, when a cause of action is commenced, the parties may try to
remove an assigned judge. Rules 63, 63 A, Ut.Civ.Proc. But these rights are
obscured and restricted when a case is reassigned to another city in the
middle of hotly contested issues being litigated. This matter should be
remanded to the Provo Courthouse for trial.
V.

The trial court abused its discretion in striking Appellant
Johnson's experts witnesses.

The trial court abused its discretion in striking and excluding
Appellant Johnson's expert witnesses who would testify about the duty to
maintain the parking lot, and the extent of the unsafe condition of the
parking lot. Appellee Gym filed for summary judgment on April 4, 2007.
Appellant Johnson, on April 24, 2007, requested more time be able to
respond to summary judgment. She explained how Appellee Peay had failed
to serve discovery answers. This Appellee is represented by the same
attorney who filed for summary judgment. Five weeks after answers were
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due counsel for Appellee Peay served objections, but no real answers. The
absence of this factual information precluded Plaintiff from getting reports
from her experts.
Appellee Peay should have lost the privilege of objecting to the
discovery when he failed to timely respond. Rule 33(b), URCP, provides 30
days to answer or object to the interrogatories. Then it adds, "All grounds
for an objection to an interrogatory shall be stated with specificity. Any
ground not stated in a timely objection is waived unless the party's failure to
object is excused by the court for good cause shown." Id. at 33(b)(4). When
no timely objection was raised, it was waived.
Then, the same defendant failed and refused to appear for a
deposition. These delays clearly prejudiced Appellant Johnson in her
attempt to identify expert witnesses and prepare their reports. Just for
example, Relevant Fact Nos. 10 and 13 show that an experienced contractor
performed work on or near the property in 2003 or 2004. This fact was only
discovered in May 2007, when Appellee Peay finally submitted to a
deposition. But this was six weeks after the motion for summary judgment
was filed. That contractor who did the work was never identified. Appellant
Johnson followed up on the little information she had and found the aerial
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overflights showed the extensive work on the pavement. This information
had never been provided.
It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to strike Appellant
Johnson's experts on July 3, 2007, and to deny her the opportunity to show
the likely defects in the pavement at the time of her injury.
VL

The trial court was without jurisdiction to enter an order on the
motion to reconsider or on defendant's motion to strike Plaintiffs
photographs and erroneously seeks to impose a rule barring any
pre-final-judgment motions to reconsider.
The trial court ruled that "when a trial court issues a decision which

disposes of all claims in a matter a party is precluded from revisting the case
by way of a "motion to reconsider." Ruling, p. 3. The trial court
acknowledges that this rule applies to post-fmal-judgments under Gillett v.
Price, 2006 UT 24, but applies this rule to its "pre-final-judgment rulings.
Ruling, p. 7.
This legal issue is one of de novo review, without deference to the
trial court.
The trial court was obviously perturbed by Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order Granting Summary Judgment. The trial court
opined that Plaintiff was just "re-arguing her case," supplementing the
record, or presenting new evidence after discovery was completed, and after
the court had worked hard on a memorandum decision.

Ruling on Motions to Reconsider, Strike and Compel, pages 7-8, filed Nov.
29, 2007.
In this spirit of resentment of having to evaluate the evidence against
summary judgment, the trial court argues for an extension of the rule in
Gillett, cutting off motions to reconsider on "pre-final-judgment rulings."
Id. p. 7. The court exclaimed "As shown here, there exists no reason to limit
this analysis to post final judgment scenarios."
Unfortunately, the trial court fails to grasp the importance of a fair
litigation process for Plaintiff. The memorandum in support of the motion to
reconsider clearly states the reasons for the motion. They included pointing
out "clear legal error" and factual error in the court's finding that there was
no fact issue of constructive notice. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of
Motoin for Reconsideration of Order Granting Summary Judgment, page 1,
filed October 10,2007.
The trial court wanted to get rid of this case on summary judgment. It
denied plaintiff an opportunity to present her evidence or be heard at trial. It
struck her expert witnesses when she had been hindered by defendants
failure to answer discovery. Plaintiff hoped to correct the trial court from its
errors so as to avoid an appeal in this matter, avoid delay of another year
before she could present her case, and help the trial court avoid the
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embarrassment of being reversed on appeal. In addition, Plaintiffs effort to
make sure the trial court clearly understood the factors in favor of Plaintiff s
opposition to summary judgment sharpened, focused and clarified the
arguments for appeal. These reasons in favor of pre-final judgment motions
to reconsider should not be stifled by a rule that bars such motions.
On the other hand, defendant filed a motion to strike photographs after
the judgment was entered on October 18, 2007, as contrasted with the prefinal judgment motion filed by plaintiff. Defendant's motion is
inappropriate under Gillett. Defendant's motion to strike photographs
clearly came after a final judgment was entered. It was filed about
November 14, 2007. There is no basis for the motion. But the trial court
granted it, even after reciting how this type of motion was barred by Gillett.
That ruling is clear legal error.
Furthermore, the trial court had no jurisdiction to issue a ruling on the
motion to reconsider 42 days after the final judgment was filed, and 13 days
after a notice of appeal was filed. The trial court's ruling should be
disregarded. It lost jurisdiction when the Notice of appeal was filed.
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CONCLUSION and RELIEF SOUGHT
IN CONCLUSION, Plaintiffs cause of action should not be
precluded by the exculpatory clause in the contract. The clause is
unenforceable because it is ambiguous in restricting the rights of injured
patrons on its premises. Premises could mean either within the gym, or
outside, including the parking lot. The ambiguity must be construed in favor
of Appellant Johnson. The clause is overbroad in that it bars actions arising
from intentional or reckless conduct. And it waives a duty that Gold's Gym
owes in providing the public where its business is one charging for public
admission, and its clients, a safe place, safe access and safe egress.
Furthermore, genuine fact issues exist as to whether Appellees had
constructive notice of the dangerous condition of the asphalt and failed to
make it safe for its business invitees. Also, the defect of the condition of the
asphalt on private property in a parking lot of a business that charges for
public admission should be evaluated as a permanent condition of property,
and not as a temporary condition that requires notice and time to fix the
condition before the business may be held liable to its business invitees.
In addition, Appellant Johnson should be allowed to complete fact
discovery, then disclose the expert witness reports, so she could use them in
opposition to summary judgment and at trial.
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Finally, this matter should be sent to the Provo Court. And Appellant
Johnson should be awarded costs for this appeal.

Respectfully submitted on this / day of June, 2008.
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